A New Era Of Malware

In the summer of 2017, a software update for a popular Ukrainian accounting software pushed malware onto systems of companies doing business in Ukraine. The attack stopped life in Ukraine and crippled the Western logistics supply chain, hitting shipping giant Maersk, postal company FedEx, and the Port of Rotterdam.

That was just the beginning effect of a chain reaction, masterminded by the Kremlin.

Pundits eagerly pointed out stolen code from the National Security Agency (NSA) within the malware to claim authority on the attack, effectively binding NSA’s exploit and the attack together whenever either comes up. 

The lingering story that stuck in the public imagination: that the Russian cyber-attack was executed with help of cyber-weapons that the NSA lost control of. The narrative that took shape showed a devastating failure of the US government, and turned public attention away from who was accountable for the attack. 

NotPetya ushered in a new era of implant-enabled warfare where public opinion is as much the target as traditional IT systems. This wasn’t “hack and leak” or “inauthentic amplification” on social media. 

This is information operations by using malware to create a narrative, and shows what the future of conflict looks like: one where malware not only disrupts our business operations but also targets our minds and influences media coverage. 

NotPetya created significant downtime and a whopping $10 billion in damages, but its most subversive impact was how it deceived the public.

There are two defining milestones in the history of cyberwar via implant. One of them showcased clandestine tradecraft. The other utilised publicly-visible cross-domain effects. Both would have a profound influence on future cyber operations.

The first was Stuxnet, which targeted Iran's nuclear centrifuges and physically damaged them. It combined the cyber domain with the realm of kinetic destruction. A clandestine operation which made for a riveting tale that’s pretty easy to comprehend. The goal of Stuxnet was to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program while evading discovery for as long as possible. On the other hand, NotPetya’s multi-domain nature doesn’t let itself get defined quite as easily. 

It’s widely accepted that NotPetya was orchestrated by Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. The GRU employs top tier offensive cyber operations and psychological operations teams. 

So what was NotPetya? 
In simple technical terms, we can say that NotPetya was a piece of destructive/wiper malware posing as ransomware. It was pushed to companies using the update mechanism of a very popular piece of Ukrainian accounting software. It is impossible to conclusively prove motive and intent without deep access inside a target organisation. In GRU’s case that would involve getting access to a person or system with the NotPetya mission plan. 

Unless a rival intelligence agency is willing to burn sources and methods, our public conversation about NotPetya’s desired effects is therefore limited to conjecture. We must get more comfortable operating in this gray zone, whether we like it or not. Otherwise our public analysis will be inherently astigmatic, which leads to bad decision making.

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