Hackers Breach Microsoft 365
Microsoft 365 users are facing a barrage of cyber attacks all aimed at a single goal, to try and expose credentials which can later be used against employers in data theft attacks.
An aggressive password-spraying campaign targeting Microsoft 365 environments generated more than 81 million login attempts over a two-week period.
The threat actor tried to authenticate via Microsoft's Azure command-line interface (CLI) using still valid username and password combinations that had been exposed in past breaches.
Different groups conduct their raids and bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) protection to access victim accounts, CloudSEK, for example, said that some groups are using BigBear 2.0, a new phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) framework that allows crooks to intercept passwords and authenticated session cookies.
Hackers have breached Microsoft 365 environments by focusing on accounts that were still active but unmonitored. An old password and missing sign-in protections gave intruders a route into email, files, and cloud applications.
Western Sydney University has informed approximately 7,500 individuals of an unauthorised access incident involving its IT network.
The University promptly shut down the intrusion, initiated an investigation, and implemented remediation measures to prevent further unauthorized access.
Interim Vice-Chancellor Professor Clare Pollock expressed deep regret over the incident, stating, “On behalf of the University, I unreservedly apologize for this incident and its impact on our community.
It is deeply regrettable, and we are committed to transparently rectifying the matter and fulfilling our obligations.”
These campaigns have also focused heavily on organisations in Chile, including a large retailer and financial institutions. Rather than repeatedly guessing passwords for one person, the operator tested likely default passwords across many accounts, then used successful logins to explore cloud services.
Proofpoint analysts identified the activity as UNK_CondorFiltration, a campaign abusing TeamFiltration, a testing framework rather than a new malware strain.
Hackers hit 5,714 accounts across 28 Microsoft 365 tenants and produced seven confirmed compromises.
The numbers underline a narrow but serious weakness. None of the confirmed breaches involved personal employee accounts. Every affected identity was a functional or service account, the kind created to process payments, run ticketing, support point-of-sale systems, or perform other routine tasks without a person regularly logging in.
Hackers Accessed Microsoft 365 Via Forgotten Accounts
Researchers found that the seven compromised accounts had no earlier legitimate sign-in activity in the available records. Six were breached within seven minutes, a pattern that points to shared or unchanged default passwords rather than individually stolen credentials.
The accounts remained enabled, lacked clear ownership, and apparently had no multi-factor authentication, or MFA, to stop a valid password from being enough.
One retailer accounted for 25,715 of the campaign’s 32,825 authentication events, or 78.3 percent. The August 13th to 16th wave peaked at about 1,560 targeted accounts on August 15, and all seven confirmed compromises occurred at the retailer on August 14 and 15.
This is similar to a TeamFiltration method using the same framework against cloud identities. TeamFiltration can check whether accounts exist through the Teams API, test passwords at scale, and use cloud infrastructure to vary its source locations.
Following a successful sign-in, it can collect email, Teams messages, and OneDrive or SharePoint data. That makes an overlooked operational account particularly useful.
The findings point to practical safeguards. Organisations should inventory service accounts, assign an accountable owner, remove accounts that no longer serve a purpose, rotate any inherited credentials, and require MFA or a safer workload identity where possible.
Teams should also review conditional-access rules and sign-in logs for broad failures across many accounts.
Valid Access to Cloud Reconnaissance
The activity did not always end with a password check. For most affected accounts, researchers observed access to Microsoft Office, OneDrive, and Teams from the same cloud-hosted infrastructure.
In one case, the attacker changed to a German VPN node within 90 seconds of the initial compromise. The operator unsuccessfully probed the corporate VPN, then opened Azure Portal, OfficeHome, and SharePoint Online.
An MFA enrolment prompt during the Azure Portal visit indicated that the compromised account had not been configured for MFA.
The SharePoint access could have supported document discovery, data theft, or an attempt to place a harmful file where a trusted user might later open it. A request for an access token through the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility application also suggested an effort to interact with Microsoft Graph or external application interfaces.
Defenders should treat inactive accounts as an identity risk, not administrative clutter. Alerting on the distinctive user agent, password attempts from distributed cloud hosts, first-time sign-ins, and sudden access to sensitive apps can expose this type of intrusion early.
Blocking legacy or unnecessary sign-in paths and testing MFA coverage on non-human accounts can close the gap that this campaign exploited.
Cyber Security News | Proofpoint | GB Hackers | Tech Radar | Bleeping Computer |
Image: Midjourney
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