Israel Girds Itself for Cyber Warfare
The threat of cyber terrorism is not new, but it has become more sophisticated. What defines cyber 'terrorism' as opposed to warfare might also be legally disputed since there is no concrete definition of what is fair in the cyber world. In recent years,
Israel has been the target of hacking campaigns by various groups going by the moniker Anonymous, operating under campaigns like #OpIsrael or #OpGaza. It is not known if Israel's well-known enemies might be behind the latest threat.
The Institute for National Security Studies warned yesterday that a group called AnonGhost was planning an “Electronic Holocaust” on April 7th in cyber-attacks against the Jewish State. "It’s very hard to prove, but we do see some kind with terrorist organizations as you mentioned as well as state sponsors of terror behind these events."
#OpGaza - named for the Twitter hashtag promoting the campaign – was a spontaneous campaign by hackers to retaliate against Operation Protective Edge. But #OpIsrael was planned in advance, with an unknown number of hackers taking part.
Even if terrorist organizations or governments are involved, their successes have been miniscule thus far.
The real danger of hacking secure networks or interfaces belonging to any government ministries is minimized by government efforts to defend against such attacks. When asked if the decentralized nature of Israeli bureaucracy – where some ministries have their own networks not attached to those of other ministries – Cohen says that this was an issue in the past that has been ameliorated.
At this point, the threat is mostly to Israeli civilians, mainly soft targets who might be attached to larger companies. “Last week, the Israeli government announced the establishment of new cyber security authority that is supposed to protect the civilian side of the Internet. Until then, it is less protected. “
When asked if the major threats included attacks against credit-card institutions, Cohen confirmed that was the main concern, but it is was not at all clear if attacks would be successful.
“The last two attacks purported to have stolen credit card information and released it on the Internet. But it was recycled information. It was already publicly accessible.”
Cohen asserts that the main benefit of cyber warfare with Israel that hackers can reasonably hope for is using psychological warfare, though its effects might feel devastating for those who experience or see the vandalism and hacking often associated with these attacks. Israel however is assumed to have a tremendous defensive and even offensive capability in cyber warfare. Cohen cites the joint American-Israeli operation that infected Iranian nuclear systems with the Stuxnet virus.
In terms of Israel’s offensive capabilities otherwise, Cohen says that if a country is known to have a strong defense against these attacks, it is assumed to have a reciprocally good offense. But the power of Israel’s counter-offensive power on the web might lie in the hands of its civilians, not its government.
Israeli hackers humiliated several anonymous hackers whose IP addresses made them traceable, letting hackers use applications like Skype to hack computer cameras. The Israeli hackers subsequently took photos of the #OpGaza hackers, broadcasting them across the web.
Given the nascent nature of cyber warfare, Cohen says there is no definition of a “war crime” in cyberspace, though it has been debated.
