North Korean Hackers Exploit Cyber Intelligence Platforms to Evade Detection
In a revealing joint research effort, SentinelLabs and internet intelligence platform Validin have uncovered how North Korean threat actors are re-purposing defensive cyber tools to monitor and refine their malicious operations.
Released on 8 September 2025, the report details the "Contagious Interview" campaign, where Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-aligned hackers use social engineering tactics to target job seekers in the cryptocurrency and blockchain sectors.
By abusing cyber threat intelligence (CTI) platforms, these actors detect exposure, explore and map new infrastructures, and sustain campaigns despite disruptions.
The findings highlight a sophisticated, team-based approach that prioritises rapid adaptation over comprehensive overhauls, impacting at least 230 victims between January and March 2025 - though the true figure is likely far higher.
Evolution Of The Contagious Interview Campaign
The Contagious Interview cluster, linked to the broader Lazarus group, has evolved into a persistent threat targeting professionals in high-value industries. According to the report, these actors impersonate legitimate companies like Archblock, Robinhood, and eToro, luring victims with fake job offers for roles such as Portfolio Manager or Senior Product Manager.
Victims, primarily in marketing and finance within cryptocurrency and blockchain firms, are geographically dispersed worldwide.
The campaign employs the ClickFix social engineering technique, where targets are tricked into executing commands that download malware disguised as software updates or utilities. This malware is tailored to the victim's operating system - Windows, macOS, or Linux architecture. The report notes that engagement spans multiple stages, from completing phony skill assessments to initiating malware downloads via tools like curl commands.
SentinelLabs and Validin observed this activity intensifying after Validin's 11 March 2025 blog post on Lazarus infrastructure. Within 24 hours, threat actors registered multiple Validin community accounts using tracked Gmail addresses, such as info@versusx.us. Although most were blocked, one was deliberately left active for monitoring, revealing coordinated efforts across teams.
Abusing CTI Platforms For Operational Resilience
A key revelation is how DPRK actors repurpose CTI platforms - intended for defenders - to their advantage. Platforms like Validin, VirusTotal, and Maltrail are used to query infrastructure artifacts, detecting signs of exposure. The report describes real-time collaboration, with indicators suggesting use of Slack for coordinating investigations.
Despite identifying detectable artifacts, the actors implement only sporadic, limited changes. For instance, they might alter specific domain names or server configurations but avoid large-scale modifications. Instead, they focus on rapidly deploying new infrastructure following takedowns by service providers.
This strategy reflects a pragmatic approach: maintaining operational tempo amid high victim engagement rates.
The report attributes this to internal factors within North Korea's cyber operations. Decentralised command structures and resource constraints limit coordinated updates. Moreover, annual revenue quotas imposed by the regime foster competition among teams, incentivising operatives to protect their own assets rather than collaborate on broad changes. As a result, actors prioritise replacing disrupted infrastructure to meet targets and sustain revenue generation through stolen cryptocurrencies.
OPSEC Failures In Infrastructure Management
Threat actors also use CTI platforms to evaluate potential new assets before acquisition. On 25 March 2025, the monitored account queried domains like hiringassessment.net and skillquestions.com—names aligning with recruitment themes - shortly before registration. This scouting aims to avoid flagged malicious assets, reducing detection risks post-deployment. Monitoring continues throughout the asset's lifecycle, with periodic checks until takedown.
However, the report exposes significant operational security (OPSEC) lapses during deployment.
Servers like api.release-drivers.online inadvertently exposed web root directories, Node.js error logs, and usernames such as relefmwz, revealing deployment timelines. Other servers, including api.camdriverhelp.club and api.drive-release.cloud, leaked ContagiousDrop applications and victim logs, providing unintended insights into operations.
The Role of ContagiousDrop In Tracking Victims
Central to the campaign is ContagiousDrop, a Node.js application (app.js) deployed on malware distribution servers. It handles HTTP requests, delivering OS-specific payloads while logging interactions. Features include an email notification system, sending alerts from addresses like designedcuratedamy58@gmail.com when victims engage - such as starting assessments or downloading files.
Logs build a detailed victim database, recording names, emails, IP addresses, phone numbers, and interaction dates in files like client_ips_start_test.json. Analysis of these logs from January to March 2025 identified over 230 engagements, though limited to a few servers. Victims' profiles confirm targeting of crypto experts, with logs also showing internal testing using aliases like Richard Davis and Lazaro - likely referencing Lazarus.
Defensive Recommendations
The report demonstrates how attackers are using defenders' tools against them, challenging the cybersecurity community to adapt. DPRK groups, including ScarCruft, have shown prior interest in CTI, even developing malware to target researchers in 2024. This abuse reveals operational plans, enabling better tracking despite expected adaptations.
To counter this, organisations should scrutinise job offers, verify communications, and implement robust endpoint security. CTI providers must enhance account verification and monitor suspicious queries.
The report advocates sharing intelligence to empower defences, outweighing the risks of alerting actors. As North Korean cyber threats escalate, collaborative efforts like this joint investigation are crucial for disrupting campaigns and protecting vulnerable sectors.
This research not only exposes DPRK tactics but calls for heightened vigilance in an era where intelligence tools are double-edged swords.
SentinelOne | Infosecurity Magazine | IBM/XForce | Security Week | gbhackers | CyberSixt
Image: Ideogram
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