South Africa: Serious About Cyberwarfare
Shortly after 9/11, the South African government introduced measures to fight terrorism in the country, including a Bill allowing the monitoring and interception of communications. It became the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (Rica) of 2002. This replaced the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act of 1992, which did not deal adequately with technological advances.
Rica regulates interception of communications, including Internet traffic, making it illegal for communications to be intercepted except according to the Act. This provides for a designated judge to issue interception directions requested by the defence force, intelligence services or police, on crime-related or national security grounds and then interception directions are undertaken by the Office of Interception Centres (OIC). The Act requires all communications networks to be capable of surveillance. It places the obligation on all service providers to assist the state in monitoring and intercepting communications. It obliges service providers to store communication-related information at their own expense. All cellphone users must register their SIM cards and provide proof of residential address and identity numbers.
But, argues Privacy International, the grounds for issuing interception directions are too vague: the judge merely needs to be satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe an offence has been, is being or will be committed. This may not be constitutional: it allows law enforcement officers to speculate. There is no provision in the Act for people whose communications have been intercepted to be informed once the investigation is completed, or if the judge turns down the application for an interception. A key flaw in South Africa's law is lack of public oversight. The public is provided with too little information to monitor whether the Act is achieving its intended results: to fight off genuine threats to national security.
Significantly, the Act does not cover intelligence from foreign signals, or intelligence derived from communication from outside South Africa, whether it passes through or ends in the country. These signals can be intercepted without a direction. These developments strongly suggest that South Africa is serious about developing its cyberwarfare capabilities, and is willing to put copious resources into this effort, in spite of the dubious reasons for doing so.
Jane Duncan is a professor in the department of journalism, film and television at the University of Johannesburg. This is an edited extract from her new book The Rise of the Securocrats: The Case of South Africa, published by Jacana Media ein news academia edu
